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The European Policy Unit
The European Policy Unit at the European University 
Institute was created to further three main goals. First, to 
continue the development of the European University Institute as 
a forum for critical discussion of key items on the Community 
agenda. Second, to enhance the documentation available to 
scholars of European affairs. Third, to sponsor individual 
research projects on topics of current interest to the European 
Communities. Both as in-depth background studies and as policy 
analyses in their own right, these projects should prove 





















































































































































































THE CONSULTATIVE FUNCTION OF THE 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
by Roger Morgan
PREFACE
This report was written at the request of the Secretary-General of the Economic and Social 
Committee, Monsieur Jacques Moreau, and submitted in November 1990.1 am grateful to the 
Secretary-General for permission to publish the report as an EUI Working Paper. It is divided 
into five sections:
I. The rôle of the Economic and Social Committee, and some factors which limit the 
development of this rôle (p. 1)
II. The composition of the Committee as a body representative of the economic and 
social forces of Europe (p. 5)
III. The place of the Committee in the institutional system of the Community (p. 9)
IV. Possible development of the Committee’s rôle (p. 15)
V. Conclusions (p. 19)
It should be noted that the report deals only briefly with some of the well-known problems 
of consultative institutions and their function at the level both of the European Community 
and of its member-states. Many of these questions were considered in detail in a report 
submitted to the Economic and Social Committee by the Trans-European Policy Studies 
Association (TEPSA) in 1989, under the title "Le Rôle du Comité Economique et Social et 
l’Avenir de la Fonction Consultative Professionnelle dans la Communauté Européenne". I 
acknowledge my great debt to the authors of the TEPSA study; to all those - Councillors, 
members of the Secretariat, and others - who gave so generously of their time and of their 
expertise in helping me to write the present study; and to Isabelle de Fraipont for her valuable 

























































































































































































I. THE ROLE OF THE ESC; FACTORS LIMITING ITS DEVELOPMENT.
1.1. What can the ESC provide which cannot be provided by other EC institutions, or 
which these institutions could not obtain from other sources? In response to this question, it 
may be said that the Committee’s precise function, a strictly advisory one, is clearly distinct 
from those of all the other Community institutions (executive,legislative, and judicial). The 
Committee’s role is to provide the Community with advice and opinions based on a unique 
combination of expertise and representativeness. The expertise at the disposal of the 
Committee allows it to comment with authority on the most detailed aspects of Community 
policies, while the practical value of these opinions is enhanced by the fact that the 
Committee’s working methods ensure that they are based not only on expert knowledge, but 
also on a thorough and systematic confrontation between the opinions of the most influential 
economic and social interests present in the countries of Europe. There has been much debate 
about whether the Committee renders its best service when it can show a consensus on some 
controversial issue, or whether it serves a more useful function by showing exactly where the 
points of disagreement between different interests lie. This is because on some questions the 
achievement of consensus is valuable, while, on others, the clarification of the limits of 
agreement, through the process of clear and open confrontation between the interests 
represented, is the most useful outcome. It is in any case one of the important functions of 
the Committee, very widely recognised, that its procedures bring the conflicting interests of 
various economic and other "lobbies" clearly to light, rather than allowing their pressures to 
be exercised only in private. It could be added that bringing the views of different interests 
into a direct confrontation, within the Committee, may itself contribute to the promotion of 
consensus in Europe; and that - even when this does not occur - the Committee’s members, 
as a result of participating in its work, are better informed about the views of the other 
interests represented in it. Thus they can perform the valuable function of informing their own 
organisations, in Brussels and in their home countries, about these other views, and about the 
whole range of Community problems which the Committee has to consider.
1.2. There has been much discussion, in connection with the Committee’s place in the 
Community’s institutional system, of whether the role of the ESC, as the principal 




























































































usurped by other bodies.There has indeed been a proliferation of advisory bodies, the 
principal ones being created by the Commission, and most of them representing the "social 
partners": the most important have probably been the "Val Duchesse social dialogue", the 
Permanent Committee on Employment, and the earlier series of tripartite conferences. It can 
however be argued that the ESC, instead of considering these bodies or procedures as threats 
to its position, should welcome their work as complementary to its own. Even though the 
distinction between the concepts of "consultation" and "negotiation" is not absolutely precise, 
it is possible, and important, to distinguish the essentially negotiating function of the "Val 
Duchesse" dialogue (whose purpose is to reach specific agreements for implementation) from 
the purely consultative one of the ESC, where the purpose of the operation is to explore 
points of view and issues of fact in an attempt to reach an agreed opinion. If this distinction 
can indeed be respected by all concerned, the specific and unique role of the ESC as the 
central forum for (multilateral) consultation can be maintained.
1.3. The Committee can be said to have carried out its functions with some success, and 
there are strong reasons why it may expect to see its consultative function and its institutional 
status enhanced in the years to come. Briefly stated, these include:
1.3. a) the impact on Europe of such powerful forces as rapid technological
change and increased international migration, which will make the 
economic and social problems of Europe harder to resolve;
1.3. b) the commitment of the Community to carry out, before "1992" and
increasingly afterwards as well, a programme of economic integration 
of great complexity, requiring careful preparation;
1.3. c) the growing consciousness of the need for the competitivity of the
European economy in the world to be enhanced, which underlines the 
contribution to be made by a body capable of assessing the conditions 
necessary for economic development;
1.3. d) the well-known fact that "social" integration in Europe (reaffirmed in
the Single Act in the context of "economic and social cohesion", but 
until now understood largely in the economic sense) poses a number of 
difficult problems, and requires an intensification of dialogue with 




























































































1.3. e) the problem, already evident to the Commission and other Community
authorities, that the implementation of Community legislation in the 
member-states is often imperfect (and likely to become more so), so 
that closer liaison with representatives of national societies, from the 
pre-legislative stage, is more than ever desirable, to ensure that 
legislation is as "implementable", i.e. as "feasible on the ground", as 
possible;
1.3. f) the fact that the importance of the ESC, in the context of such
developments, has been more and more recognised by other Community 
institutions, notably the Commission but increasingly the Parliament as 
well.
1.4. Despite these and other arguments for the existence and the development of a European 
Community organ with the consultative and representative functions of the ESC, it is possible 
to observe a number of factors which tend to weaken its influence, or at least to prevent this 
influence from being allowed to grow. These include:
1.4. a) a strong element in the present Zeitgeist in Europe (growing already
when the concepts of "liberalisation" and "deregulation" came into 
vogue in the 1980s, and strengthened by the final discrediting of 
"socialism" in Eastern Europe), which argues that the "corporatist" or 
"collectivist" representation of economic and social interests, by bodies 
like the ESC or its national homologues, is anachronistic and harmful, 
and should be curbed;
1.4. b) a movement of re-assertion of "states’ rights” by the Community’s
member-states against the Community institutions, under the slogan of 
"subsidiarity", and motivated partly by the view that "European" 
economic or social policies formulated and adopted by these institutions 
(including the ESC) may be too abstract and remote to be relevant to 
widely-differing national situations;
1.4. c) the fact that other Community institutions, despite their growing




























































































inclined to place limits on their readiness to work with it, and above all 
to support an expansion of its role or status;
1.4. d) a tendency, on the part of some of the principal organised interests in
Europe themselves, to ignore the ESC or to assign a low importance to 
it, either because they regard its work as irrelevant to them, or because 
they have other channels of communication with the Community.
1.4. e) the sentiment that the Committee, like other Community organs, is
required, partly by the absence in the Community of a clear distinction 
between legislative and administrative acts, to pronounce an opinion on 
every subject imaginable, with the result that too many of these 





























































































II. THE COMPOSITION OF THE COMMITTEE: HOW REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FORCES OF EUROPE?
II. 1. The Treaties establishing the ESC clearly lay down that it should be "representative"
of the main economic and social forces, but in fact its representative capacity has been ques­
tioned on a number of distinct grounds. The aspects which should be considered include the 
following:
11.1. a) The spread of interests represented. It is often argued that, while
the present Groups I and II adequately represent the organised 
"social partners" of industrial society, the Committee does not 
properly reflect the diversity of social groups to be found outside 
the organised structure of industrial production. Is there not a case 
for increasing the representation of consumer and ecological 
movements, and of the worlds of information and other new 
technology, the services sector, research, education, and the mass 
media? (It may of course be objected that an excessive extension 
of the Committee’s membership would make consensus harder to 
reach; and that the organisations represented in Groups I and II in 
any case have well-articulated views on such questions as that of 
the environment, so that no additional representation of those 
concerned with them is required.In any case it might be desirable, 
if the membership of the Committee were to be enlarged, for the 
existing balance of numbers between Groups I, II, and III to be 
maintained: thus representatives of the "new" interests would have 
to be able to affiliate, in addition, to one or another of the 
Groups.)
11.1. b) The under-representation of the larger member-states. As the
figures show (Annex), the four larger countries are distinctly 
under-represented, in a way which is particularly striking if the 
(overall) increase of representation in the Committee is compared 
with that in the European Parliament: from 1957 to 1987 the size 




























































































Parliament increased proportionately from 1 to 3.65. Without 
suggesting that a consultative Committee should necessarily 
increase in size at the same rate as an elected Parliament, it may 
be argued that an increase in the seats allocated to the four larger 
member-states, from 24 to 36 each, would allow them to put 
forward additional members to "cover” the under-represented 
branches of society mentioned above. (The desirability of 
maintaining a balance between the three Groups, mentioned in the 
previous paragraph, would also have to be kept in mind.)
11.1. c) The disproportions between the representation of different
interests. It has been argued that the lists of nominations from the 
member-states sometimes result in the over-representation of 
certain economic interests (for instance agriculture) at the expense 
of others, and that the Council of Ministers, by simply confirming 
without question these national lists, fails to take the opportunity 
of redressing the imbalance. For the Council to be more actively 
involved in this way - taking account of the advice of the 
Commission - would not involve any amendment of the Treaties, 
but only their application.
11.1. d) The strengthening of the Committee by the admission of alternate
members ("suppléants"). The rule that members of the Committee 
are appointed "in their personal capacity" means that, even though 
they may appoint substitutes to represent them at working groups, 
this is not allowed for plenary or section meetings. The experience 
of comparable consultative bodies where alternate members are 
permitted (e.g. the Consultative Committee of the ECSC, or the 
Social and Economic Council in the Netherlands) suggests that 
this practice ensures a high quality of membership (the leading 
representatives of economic interests will accept membership if 
their presence is not expected at every meeting). The argument 
that the ESC should not add alternate members on grounds of 




























































































imately one per cent of the Committee’s current budget. Another 
argument often put forward against the introduction of a system 
of alternates is that some present members of the Committee are 
opposed to this reform: if this is an important consideration, 
perhaps an acceptable compromise would be that the Committee 
should organise, in addition to its normal programme of work, a 
special annual high-level conference, to which the top leaders of 
the organisations represented in the ESC would be invited. This 
would associate them, and their organisations, more closely with 
the work of the Committee, without obliging them to accept the 
responsibilites of personal membership.
11.1. e) Links with corresponding bodies at member-state level. Most of
the Community’s member-states have consultative bodies which 
correspond in some degree to the ESC. One of the consequences 
of this is that a certain duplication of work occurs, as both the 
Community’s ESC and these national bodies are called on to work 
on the same problems, often without co-ordinating their efforts. 
There are indeed networks for communication between the 
Secretaries-General of the organisations concerned, and a certain 
number of joint activities have been carried out. As an additional 
step, however, it should be considered whether, for instance, the 
chairmen or committee chairmen or other members of the national 
bodies should not have observer status at the ESC. (This might 
help to overcome the fears about subsidiarity, mentioned above, 
1.3.b)
11.1. f) Links with regional authorities within member-states. The
European Parliament’s Martin Report of 1990 underlined the 
importance of sub-national levels of government by calling for the 
establishment of a new Community advisory body, with a similar 
status to that of the ESC, to represent the views of the regions. 
Such an assembly would no doubt represent a development and 




























































































Regional and Local Authorities, a small body of 42 members 
established in 1988. It could be argued that such a body, 
composed of the democratically-elected political representatives 
of regional governments, would be different in nature from the 
ESC, and should thus have a separate existence: against this, 
however, it must be said that the separation of "regional” from 
"economic and social" interests is highly artificial. It might be 
much more useful to find a way of integrating the proposed new 
regional representation directly with the ESC - perhaps in an 
enlarged Regional Policy Section, or as a standing Sub­
committee of Regional Representatives.
Il.l.g) Links with Community-level interest groups. The relations of the 
ESC with "European" interest organisations appear always to have 
been complicated, and - in view of the important contribution 
these organisations already make towards the creation of a 
Community-level consensus - unsatisfactory. Indeed, it seems 
clear that representatives of employers’ and labour organisations 
at the Community level are permanently involved, through their 
day-to-day work, in just the sort of confrontation (and often 
reconciliation) of different interests which the ESC exists to 
promote. In view of this, should not steps be taken to ensure the 
presence of more representatives from these bodies in the 
Committee? Would it suffice if they were given more influence 
on the nominations put forward by national governments (and if 
so, how can this be done?), or would it be desirable - as proposed 
in the 1989 TEPSA report on the Committee - to give them the 
right to nominate some Councillors directly, so as to 




























































































III. THE ESC IN THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM OF THE COMMUNITY.
111.1. Introduction
IH.l.a) In September 1990 the Bureau of the ESC issued a statement calling for 
the modification of Art.4, Para.l of the Treaty of Rome, and the 
corresponding Article of the ECSC Treaty, to read as follows: "La 
réalisation des tâches confiées à la Communauté est assurée par:
- un Parlement européen,
- un Conseil,
- une Commission,
- un Comité économique et social à caractère consultatif,
- une Cour de Justice".
111.1. b) It is in the context of this call for a re-formulation of the Committee’s
position among the institutions of the Community, and of the 
discussions to be held during the Inter-governmental Conference of 
1990-91, that we must consider the ESC’s relations with the other actors 
in the system: the Parliament, the member-states, the Commission, and 
the Council (including COREPER).
111.2. The Parliament
111.2. a) One of the central actors in the promotion of the Inter-govemmental
Conference (IGC), and in influencing its work, is the Parliament, which 
is acting as a motor of change, rather as it did through its Draft Treaty 
of European Union in 1984-86. The European Parliament has already 
made it clear that it will work in the course of the IGC for an 
up-grading of its own rôle, both in the co-operation procedure and in 
general. The degree of success that will attend these efforts is not clear, 
but we can already envisage a change in the Parliament’s rôle, from an 
essentially advisory one in the early years of the Community to a rôle 
as co-legislator by the 1990s. As the Parliament makes this clear 
transition, the distinction between its own rôle and that of the ESC (still 




























































































IH.2.b) In parallel, then, with the acquisition of greater legislative authority on 
the part of the Parliament, it would be logical and even necessary for 
the ESC to be given increased recognition as the principal consultative 
body in the decision-making process. The Committee should not only 
do its best to convince the Parliament that it is not a rival, but 
potentially a powerful ally: indeed, this should become abundantly 
clear, as the legislative powers of the Parliament increase, leaving the 
Committee more evidently responsible for the rôle of advising - in the 
sense both of giving opinions on specific items of legislation and of 
functioning more generally as an advisory body to the Parliament, as 
well as to the Commission and the Council.
III.2.C) As such a division of labour between the Parliament and the Committee 
becomes more evident, the Parliament should be more ready to 
welcome procedural revisions going in the direction of requiring the 
Parliament to take more account of the opinions and of the consultative 
rôle of the Committee. It would be logical for the IGC, if - as is to be 
expected - it gives a greater legislative rôle to the Parliament, to ensure 
at the same time that this body is guaranteed to act with the benefit of 
the expert and balanced advice of the Committee. This could be 
achieved by giving a formal Treaty basis to the status of the ESC as an 
advisory body to the Parliament, as well as to the Commission and the 
Council. The Parliament might be placed under an obligation to consult 
the Committee before completing its first reading of legislation, and to 
take its views into account; and there might be a revision of the 
co-operation procedure laid down by the Single Act, allowing 
Parliament, if it wished, to seek the opinion of the Committee before 
adopting its final position in second reading.
The experience of recent years suggests further reasons why the 
Parliament might be expected to welcome the support of the 
Committee. There have been several cases where committee rapporteurs 
of the Parliament have been glad to make use of the advice of their 





























































































combines the necessary technical expertise with the agreed - or partly 
agreed - consensus of a wide range of social and economic interests. A 
recent example concerned the rôle of fiscal harmonisation in the 
liberalisation of the internal market, a somewhat technical but also 
highly political issue, on which the EP’s rapporteur was glad to draw 
on the work done by the ESC. It has also been evident that Parliament, 
when preparing its first reading position on legislation falling under the 
co-operation procedure (and thus not susceptible to the introduction of 
new points at the stage of the second reading), has taken particular care 
to inform itself in advance of the views of the ESC; the standing of the 
Committee has also been improved by the fact that the Council now 
transmits its own common position, as a matter of normal procedure, 
to the Committee. This is a recognition of the Committee’s rôle which 
had no counterpart in the procedure in force before 1987.
II1.3. The member-states.
III.3.a) It should also be noted that, just as the Parliament will, during the IGC, 
deploy considerable efforts to influence the national parliaments of the 
member-states in favour of institutional reform (not least by following 
up the inter-parliamentary "assizes" held in Rome at the end of 
November 1990), it would be to the ESC’s advantage to try to carry out 
a parallel strategy. It would help the Committee if its members could 
mobilize support in their respective national parliaments to try to ensure 
that the enhanced rôle of the Committee, envisaged here, received 
support at the national level. It should go without saying that any 
influence which members of the Committee could exert on their 
national governmental authorities, which will have the decisive voice 
in the IGC itself, would be useful. At the highest level of governmental 
authority, indeed, it would of course be of the greatest benefit to the 
ESC if an improvement in its status were recommended by the 
European Council. However, the key position of national parliaments 






























































































parliaments will have to ratify the outcome of the IGC before it can 
take effect. The increasingly systematic contacts between specialist 
committees of the European and national parliaments, which are now 
developing, provide a basis for discussions on this point.
III.4.The Commission
111.4. a) The ESC’s relationship with the Commission is at once less formal and
more intensive than those with the Parliament and the Council: it 
depends heavily on informal communication between officials, as well 
as on the procedural arrangements laid down formally. There has been 
much debate about the desirability of the Commission’s informing the 
Committee of its general policy goals at an early stage of its planning, 
rather than waiting until a draft regulation or directive has already been 
formulated. This debate, naturally, has been stimulated by the initiative 
which the Commission took in 1988 in asking the Committee to give 
an opinion on the idea of a charter of basic social rights, which 
preceded, and clearly influenced, the proposals put forward by the 
Commission, and in part adopted by the European Council in December 
1989. The desirability of making such procedures general is, however, 
open to question. On the one hand, there are evident advantages if the 
Commission communicates its general intentions at an early stage to the 
Committee, so that preparations for a more considered opinion can be 
made. (Incidentally, such "early warning" can also be useful in the 
Commission’s dealings with the Parliament.) On the other hand, 
however, if the Commission took the more radical step of actually 
consulting the ESC in advance on the details of proposed legislation 
(creating what has been called an "upstream involvement" of the 
Committee), this could have negative effects on the status of the 
Committee’s independent advice.
111.4. b) In general, the procedures established for communication between the
Commission and the ESC, concerning the former’s programme of work, 




























































































of the communication by Mrs Papandreou to the Commission (8 May 
1989: "Relations avec le Comité Economique et Social") are being 
effectively implemented: they include regular monthly reports from 
each Commission Directorate General to the General Secretariat (which 
transmits them to the ESC) on its respective legislative proposals.
III.5. Relations with the Council (and with COREPER)
111.5. a) In view of the central rôles of the Council and of COREPER in the
Community’s legislative process (and of the fact that the ESC is legally 
an advisory body to the Council as well as to the Commission), 
relations in this direction cannot be described as satisfactory. In contrast 
to the fairly efficacious synchronisation of work programmes between 
the ESC and the Commission, co-ordination with the Council seems to 
suffer from certain failures of communication. Not only is the Council 
not usually represented at the ESC’s meetings by an official technically 
qualified to follow the proceedings; there are often conflicts of 
timetable between the ESC’s debates on a question and the meetings of 
the relevant Council working-group. A better system of communication 
concerning timetables, at the level of Council working-parties, would 
increase the chances of the Council’s being well-informed about the 
contribution which the ESC could make, and often does make, 
concerning the subjects on its agenda. A closer co-ordination between 
the timetables of the Council and of the ESC would allow the 
Committee to make a greater contribution to the Community’s 
decision-making process, despite all the obstacles created by the 
cumbersome structure of COREPER and the dominant influence of the 
national administrations.
111.5. b) Many of the proposals made in the Committee’s Memorandum to the
Council of 20 June 1989, concerning the Committee’s future rôle, have 
not yet received an answer. In view of the important rôle the 
Committee can play in the development of the Community towards 




























































































it would seem logical for it to be given the status of a Community 
institution with full autonomy and responsibility: this would imply the 
control (within certain limits) of its own budget, and the recognition of 
its right to its own internal management on such matters as its 




























































































IV. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMITTEE’S ROLE
IV.l.Introduction
This section of our report will consider certain possible extensions of the ESC’s present 
activities, all of them falling under the general heading of "consultative work". Some or all 
of them might at some future date be added to the Committee’s present work, in order to 
increase the effectiveness of this, and/or to increase knowledge of it in circles where it is 
inadequately understood or appreciated. It should be stressed that this is not a proposal that 
the Committee’s work-load should be increased without its being provided with the necessary 
additional resources; nor that the Committee should let itself be distracted from its central rôle 
of improving Community legislation by giving good advice in good time. The suggestions 
which follow merely sketch some possible extensions of the Committee’s present consultative 
rôle, without listing them in any particular order of priority. They concern the following: 
greater publicity; advice on future policies; advice on policy implementation; and the informal 
reinforcement of written opinions.
IV.2. Greater publicity.
As we have seen, many of the Committee’s opinions have been welcomed by those to 
whom they were addressed, and have had a certain influence. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that the Committee’s work is not adequately known; there is surprising ignorance, 
for instance, of the fact that its plenary sessions are open to the public. Some of the potential 
addressees of the Committee’s advice, in the other institutions of the Community, may not 
be fully convinced of its value. There is a risk that they may believe that the collective 
opinion of the Committee may be no different from the sum of the views of the sectional 
interests which compose it, each of which they - the addressees - may think they can and 
should obtain directly. Hence the importance of maintaining, and of ensuring wider awareness 
of, the special nature and quality of the ESC’s "product": if, for instance, the Committee’s 
atmosphere and working methods, those of consultation and dialogue, lead the "social 
partners", in certain cases, to accept or to propose opinions other than those they adopt 
elsewhere, this important fact should be brought firmly to the attention of those concerned. 




























































































between a majority and a minority opinion, it might be advantageous if both opinions, and 
the numbers of those voting on each side, were reported to the Committee’s interlocutors.
IV.3. Advice on future policies.
It may be asked whether the concept and practice of "consultation" should be essentially 
linked, as it has tended to be, with the process of legislation. No doubt the Committee’s 
central role in Community policy-making should continue to be to furnish advice on 
legislation which is being proposed or contemplated - preferably at an early stage in the 
process. However, the advisory function, by its very nature, lends itself readily to the "input" 
of ideas at other stages of the policy-making and governing processes of the Community, 
stages not directly concerned with the legislative programme as such. Despite its limited 
resources, the Committee has sometimes been able to combine the role of legislative advisor 
with that of a "think-tank" playing an active and innovative role in the international "market" 
of reflection on issues of European public policy. Examples of this have included a number 
of the Committee’s "own initiative" opinions and "information" reports, as well as the 
conferences which it has conceived and organised on major questions of policy - for instance, 
new technologies, the European social space, or the nuclear safety code. (Further examples 
of effective initiatives by the Committee include the conference on co-operative enterprises
- "the social economy" - which led to the creation of D.G. XXIII of the Commission, and the 
Committee’s expert advice to Commissioner Andriessen on the development of vocational 
training in Eastern Europe.) Before the adoption of the Single Act, it was possible to argue 
that the important function of serving as a long-term "policy think-tank" for the Community
- identifying and exploring questions not yet the subject of active political debate, and 
producing forward-looking reports on them - could be carried out by the European Parliament: 
indeed, to some extent it was. Is it possible, now that Parliament is increasingly occupied by 
its legislative work, for the ESC (if provided with the necessary resources) to increase its 
own "advisory" role in this direction, in addition to its strictly "consultative" work on current 
legislation? No doubt it should not try to produce too many "own initiative" opinions (not 
more perhaps than ten a year), but surely some extension of the "initiatory advisory" role 




























































































IV.4. Advice on policy implementation.
The earlier reference to the problems of implementation (II.2.e.above) suggests another 
direction in which the expertise and the representativeness of the ESC might allow it to 
extend its consultative role. As several recent studies have shown, the problem of incomplete 
or defective implementation of Community legislation remains considerable. There is a risk 
that the problem will grow as the volume of legislation increases. The principal responsibility 
for ensuring compliance with Community law lies, of course, with the Commission, but it 
does need help in this task. For instance, it needs to seek the help of the European Parliament 
in putting pressure on national parliaments. However, the question of implementation has 
many dimensions. As was suggested earlier (para.I.3.e), the ESC’s explicit opinion on the ease 
with which proposed legislation is "implementable1' would be valuable: indeed, a recent 
opinion of the Committee in the field of social policy has directly recognised the importance 
of this question by demanding the right to carry out an annual review of the policy area 
concerned, in the light of the Commission’s annual report on it. (Such an "evolving control" 
also exists, of course, in the Committee’s annual reviews on the economic situation of the 
Community, on competition policy, and on the use made of the structural funds.) A further 
reason why it would be of value for the Committee to play a part in the monitoring and 
evaluation of Community policies (a role which would be distinct from the legal one of the 
Commission, and from the financial control of the Court of Auditors), is that in future years 
the Community is likely to be concerned less with legislation, and more with the management 
of policies already in operation (for instance the implementation of competition policy, or the 
distribution and administration of the structural funds, etc.). If the consultation of the ESC in 
this managerial process is accepted as being desirable, it could be developed in several 
different ways. In the essential area of conjunctural policy, for instance, it would be possible 
to associate the Committee with the ongoing monitoring of the economic performance of the 
member-states, as well as with the production of proposals by the Commission for 
adjustments in national economic policies (as suggested in amendments to the Parliament’s 
draft Report of 1990 on Economic and Monetary Union, PE 140.147). The Commission’s 
annual reports on the harmonisation of technical standards will also provide opportunities for 
the ESC to give advice based on its members’ knowledge of developments on the ground. 
More generally, it would be possible for each specialist Section of the ESC to issue periodic 




























































































research and development, etc) in whose elaboration it had participated. Such evaluative 
reviews of Community policies by the ESC - based where appropriate on concrete 
information which its members’ organisations could be asked to provide - might be more 
valuable to the Commission than some of the reports it now receives from its own committees 
of experts: they would certainly be less costly to the Community, as the ESC’s "network1' 
operates at practically no cost.
IV.5. The informal reinforcement of written opinions.
A final question, which goes in this same direction of enhancing the Committee’s con­
sultative role in Community policy-making, and its influence and profile in policy- making 
circles, is how far it is possible to go beyond the medium of formal written communication 
between the Committee and its various interlocutors. It is no doubt of central importance for 
the Committee to be formally "seized" in good time with a request for an opinion; for this 
opinion to be communicated in due time to delegates to meetings of the Council; and for the 
Committee to receive as much and as clear information as possible about the follow-up given 
to its opinions. Similarly, the formal participation of the Committee in the inter-institutional 
bodies which plan the Community’s legislative timetable is obviously of critical importance. 
At the same time, however, it is worth underlining that the follow-up to an opinion can be 
said to begin even before that opinion is delivered. In view of this, should the ESC (both 
members and secretariat) not make even greater efforts than hitherto to establish a position 
by informal contacts at an early stage of the consideration of policy by the Commission staff? 
Should they not take every opportunity for informal contacts with MEPs (which ought now 
to be easier, as the MEPs spend an increasing proportion of their time in Brussels)? And 
should the CES not follow the suggestion, made by its President Basil de Ferranti as long ago 
as 1978, that it should systematically try after each plenary session to ensure that the ministers 
in national governments (or their senior advisors) are personally "lobbied" by appropriate 





























































































In several passages of this report, analysis of the past and the present has been followed 
by suggestions concerning the future. This section will attempt to summarise the conclusions 
of the whole report, concentrating particularly on those suggestions for possible future action 
which seem to us to be worth consideration, in the light of our interpretation of the present 
situation. To concentrate in this way on suggestions for change inevitably means placing the 
emphasis on the weaker aspects of the Committee’s situation. It should therefore be strongly 
underlined that the Committee is able to offer uniquely valuable advice to the decision­
makers of the European Community (see para.I.l), and that there are good reasons for 
believing that its role will in future be more widely recognised and appreciated (para. 1.3). 
Some of the suggestions which follow might help in this process:
1) The ESC might consider how the organised interests which it represents 
could be induced to attach more importance to its work (para.I.4.d).
2) The ESC might concentrate rather more on the opinions it expresses on 
important subjects, and give less attention to the minor ones (I.4.e).
3) Attention could be given to increasing the spread of interests represented in 
the ESC (Il.l.a).
4) The same applies to the representation of the larger member-states (Il.l.b).
5) The Council should use its power to ensure a better balance of interests in 
the ESC (II.l.c).
6) Consideration should be given to admitting alternate members, or to other 
ways of associating the leaders of major organised interests with the ESC’s 
work (Il.l.d; this is related to Point 1 above).
7) The ESC’s links with its national counterparts might be intensified (Il.l.e).
8) A closer relationship might be sought with representatives of Europe’s 
regional authorities (Il.l.f).
9) Ways might be sought to associate the important Community-level 
organisations of economic interests more effectively with the ESC (Il.l.g).





























































































11) The concept that a qualified consultative ESC can give powerful assistance 
to a more pre-occupied legislative Parliament deserves active promotion 
(III.2.a-d).
12) The ESC needs to increase its support in the capitals of the member-states 
(II1.3.a).
13) The ESC’s good relations with the Commission need to be cultivated 
(III.4.a-b).
14) The ESC might press the Council for more co-operation in planning work 
programmes (III.5.a).
15) It might also press for an answer on the non-answered points of its 
Memorandum of June 1989 (III.5.b).
16) More effective publicity might increase awareness of the specific contribution 
the ESC can provide in the policy-making process of the Community (IV.2).
17) The ESC’s consultative function might be extended to include more 
forward-looking assessments of future problems (IV.3).
18) The ESC could increase its already very useful activity in the field of 
monitoring and evaluating how Community policies are implemented (IV.4).
19) The ESC might in various ways increase its efforts to reinforce the influence 





























































































EVOLUTION DE LA COMPOSITION DU PARLEMENT EUROPEEN 











BELGIQUE 14 12 14 12 24 12 24 12 24 12
DANEMARK - - 10 9 16 9 16 9 16 9
R.F.A. 36 24 36 24 81 24 81 24 81 24
GRECE - - - - - - 24 12 24 12
ESPAGNE - - - - - - - - 60 21
FRANCE 36 24 36 24 81 24 81 24 81 24
IRLANDE - - 10 9 15 9 15 9 15 9
ITALIE 36 24 36 24 81 24 81 24 81 24
LUXEMB. 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
PAYS-BAS 14 12 14 12 24 12 24 12 25 12
PARTUGAL - - - - - - - - 24 12
ROY.-UNI - - 36 24 81 24 81 24 81 24
TOTAUX 142 101 198 144 410 144 434 156 518 189
SOURCE: Traité instituant la Communauté économique européenne (dans sa version originelle, et tel que
modifié après les différentes adhésions et après l’adoption de l’Acte portant élection des 
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